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Abstract
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was designed to improve the accuracy and reliability
of ﬁnancial reporting and prohibits public companies from granting loans to executives.
Without considering the eﬀects of executive loans on ﬁnancial reporting, some researchers have questioned the appropriateness of the Act’s loan prohibition [Kahle, K., Shastri, K., 2004. Executive loans. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39 (4),
791–811; Henderson, M., Spindler, J., 2005. Corporate Heroin: A defense of perks,
executive loans, and conspicuous consumption. The Georgetown Law Journal 93 (6)].
We examine whether executive loans are associated with ﬁnancial misstatements. We
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between executive loans and ﬁnancial misstatements.
Our results suggest that a relationship exists between the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s loan
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prohibition and the Act’s objective of improving the accuracy and reliability of ﬁnancial
reporting.
Ó 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Misstatement; Executive loans; Sarbanes-Oxley Act

1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the US Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The objective of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act is to ‘‘. . . improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures’’
(H.R. 3763, page 1). Section 402 of the Act prohibits corporate loans to executives. The loan prohibition amendment was added late in the legislative process, with little congressional discussion of how prohibiting loans to corporate
executives would enhance the Act’s objective of improving ﬁnancial reporting
and disclosure.
Some recent research has asserted that executive loans may be useful, without
considering the potential eﬀects of these loans on ﬁnancial reporting accuracy.
For instance, Kahle and Shastri (2004) indicated that their research, which
focused on whether executive loans are used for stock purchases, ‘‘call[s] into
question the wisdom of a sweeping ban on all loans to executives. . .’’. Henderson and Spindler (2005) assert that executive loans create a dependency between
the executive and the ﬁrm, and call the loan prohibition provision of SarbanesOxley ‘‘severe overreaching’’. The chair of the Senate Banking Committee has
also indicated that he plans to hold hearings to determine whether portions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act should be scaled back or repealed (Labaton, 2005).
We empirically examine whether granting executive loans in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley period was associated with misstated ﬁnancial statements. Specifically, we examine whether 106 revenue misstatements during the late 1990s
and early 2000s were associated with companies’ granting loans to their executives. We ﬁnd that companies that granted loans to executives were signiﬁcantly more likely to misstate their ﬁnancial statements, suggesting that the
anti-loan provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley are consistent with the Act’s overall
goal of enhancing the accuracy and reliability of ﬁnancial reporting.

2. Background and research question
2.1. Research supportive of executive loans
Arguments in favor of executive loans (and thus not supportive of the antiloans provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley) often focus on the use of these loans for exec-
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utives to purchase the company’s shares. For example, Rich and Jones (2005)
notes that executive loans are often ‘‘intended to make it easier for executives to
exercise their stock options and hold a larger number of shares.’’ The expectation
is that executives who own large amounts of company stock will be more likely to
act in shareholder interests, because the executives are shareholders themselves.
Kahle and Shastri (2004) examined the reasons companies provided for
granting executive loans, and found three main reasons: to buy stock, to exercise (and pay tax on the gain from) options, and for relocations. They also
found that 64% of executive loans were secured with company stock, and that
up to 12.6% of the loans were forgiven within the time of their study.
Kahle and Shastri (2004) also examined whether executives actually used the
proceeds of stock and option loans for their intended purpose. Their overall
results indicate that ‘‘a loan that enables a manager to buy 100 shares of stock
results in only an eight-share increase in ownership’’ (Kahle and Shastri, 2004,
p. 810). They attribute the small increase in share ownership to executives selling shares they already owned when new loans are granted. When they partition their sample into high and low pre-loan share ownership, they ﬁnd that
managers who own few shares when the loan is granted increase their share
ownership substantially more than managers who already own a large number
of shares. These results lead Kahle and Shastri (2004, p. 811) to ‘‘question the
wisdom of an outright ban on these loans, especially for managers for whom
ownership levels are low.’’ Note that Kahle and Shastri (2004) did not consider
whether loans may be associated with ﬁnancial misstatements.
2.2. Research not supportive of executive loans
Arguments against executive loans (and thus in favor of retaining the loans
prohibition of Sarbanes-Oxley) come mainly from two areas. The ﬁrst is the
observation that executive loans were evident in some recent instances of misstated ﬁnancials; the second is evidence that shareholders are not supportive of
executive loans.
2.2.1. Loans and misstatements
King (2002) examines the prevalence of executive loans. Of the top 1500
companies in the U.S., 510 companies (more than 33%) granted loans to executives for stock purchases prior to passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (King, 2002). He
also ﬁnds that public companies with the largest executive loans outstanding
were Adelphia Communications, WorldCom and Tyco, all of which have been
involved in high proﬁle ﬁnancial statement misstatements in recent years.
One argument for why loans may be associated with misstatements is based
on Henderson and Spindler’s (2005) assertion that executive loans make the
executive ‘‘more dependent’’ (p. 48) on the ﬁrm. While Henderson and Spindler
contend that such dependency is ‘‘good’’ (p. 48), greater ﬁnancial dependency
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may also put pressure on executives to misstate ﬁnancial results (AICPA,
2003). Jensen (2004) makes a similar point in suggesting that an excessive interest in value creation may create incentives to meet analysts’ short run expectations, even if this requires misstating ﬁnancial results to create the appearance
of strong ﬁnancial performance.
2.2.2. Shareholder perceptions of executive loans
Research examining shareholder perceptions of executive loans has generally found that shareholders do not view executive loans favorably. Ruxton
(1999, cited in Thomas and Martin, 2000) ﬁnds that institutional investors
often view loans, particularly those with below market interest rates, as preferential treatment of executives. Of the institutional investors surveyed by Ruxton, approximately 22% had a policy of not supporting stock option plans
containing executive loan provisions.
Thomas and Martin (2000) examined factors associated with shareholder
votes on stock option plans. They ﬁnd that 24.8% of shareholders vote against
plans that contain executive loan provisions, while only 16.4% of shareholders
vote against plans that do not contain loan provisions, a diﬀerence that is statistically signiﬁcant. They conclude that ‘‘Shareholders appear to disapprove of
this practice [granting loans to executives]. . .’’ (Thomas and Martin, 2000, p. 68).
2.3. Legislative history of executive loans
Barnard (1989) notes that in the 1980s, many state corporate statutes, which
previously disfavored executive loans, were amended to allow these loans if the
board of directors determined that the loan ‘‘is expected to beneﬁt the corporation.’’ The issue of the propriety of executive loans again arose in 2002 in the
aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom misstatements, when the SarbanesOxley Act was adopted.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act was ﬁrst proposed in February 2002. In the original
proposed Act, there was no provision prohibiting loans to executives
(H.R.3763.RFS). Consideration for banning loans to executives appears to
be linked to President Bush’s speech on July 9, 2002 in which he called for
‘‘. . .compensation committees to put an end to all company loans to corporate
oﬃcers’’ (Bush, 2002). Shortly thereafter, Senator Jay Rockefeller denounced
executive loans on the ﬂoor of the Senate, saying ‘‘These loans are eﬀectively
theft from the employees and shareholders, since they represent revenue given
in compensation which will never be repaid, reinvested, or distributed as dividends.’’ (Rockefeller, 2002).
On July 12, 2002, Senator Charles Schumer proposed an amendment to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Bill to prohibit loans to executives of public companies. His
rationale for the amendment was the large number of instances in which companies involved in high proﬁle misstatements, such an Enron, WorldCom and
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Adelphia, had granted loans to executives. He then posed the question: ‘‘Why
can’t these super rich executives go the corner bank like everyone else.’’ (Schumer, 2002). He concluded by asserting that ‘‘This is just wrong and it must be
stopped.’’ With little debate or discussion, the amendment passed3 and eventually was included in the ﬁnal Sarbanes-Oxley Act as Section 402.
2.4. Research question
Whether executive loans are associated with ﬁnancial statement misstatements has not been previously examined. This issue is of particular relevance
at a time when lawmakers are considering revisions to the Act, and when some
researchers are criticizing the anti-loan provision. We therefore seek to examine
the following research question: Are ﬁrms that grant loans to executives more
likely to misstate their ﬁnancial statements?
3. Research methods
3.1. Sample
To examine whether loans to executives are associated with ﬁnancial misstatements, we identiﬁed companies that had misstated their ﬁnancial results
using the GAO Restatement Database (GAO, 2003). This source provides
information on publicly traded companies that restated their ﬁnancial statements between 1997 and 2002. Note that while the restatements were disclosed
during the 1997–2002 period, the misstatements often began in earlier periods.
We chose to focus on revenue misstatements due to their unambiguous eﬀect
on income and their prevalence during this time period (Beasley et al., 1999).
The GAO database includes 329 companies (excluding repeated entries of
the same misstatement) that misstated revenues. The list was reduced for foreign companies (11), entries that were erroneously identiﬁed as related to revenue (43), and entries for which the period involved could not be clearly
determined (46). We also excluded 94 companies that restated in response to
Staﬀ Accounting Bulletin (SAB) 101 or EITF pronouncements.4 Finally, 29
3
This amendment was one of only three (out of more than 90 proposed) to make it into the ﬁnal
bill. Ivanovich (2002) suggests that President Bush’s receipt of loans from his former employers was
one of the reasons the loan prohibition amendment ‘‘went to the front of the line’’ (p. 1).
4
Firms adopting SAB 101 were inconsistent in their accounting treatments. Some ﬁrms restated
the previously issued quarterly results for the year in which SAB 101 was adopted, whereas others
made no retroactive adjustments. Also, many companies restating for SAB 101 did so only for the
previously issued quarters of the year in which the change was made, rather than changing all of the
pre-SAB 101 periods. We would therefore be unable to determine the period when any actual
misstatement may have began.
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companies were eliminated due to insuﬃcient disclosure in the proxy statements. Based on these restrictions, our ﬁnal sample consists of 106 ﬁrms with
ﬁnancial misstatements.5 Our sample may contain misstatements that are unintentional as well as intentional; the GAO database does not clearly distinguish
between intentional and unintentional misstatements. If there are unintentional
misstatements in the sample, and if executive loans are solely incentives to
intentionally misstate, then our inclusion of these misstatements in our analyses
would bias against ﬁnding signiﬁcance on the loans variables.
To test whether executive loans are associated with misstatements, we identiﬁed a matching sample of ﬁrms that did not misstate their ﬁnancial results
during the same period. Matching ﬁrms were selected based on SIC code
and ﬁrm size. We endeavored to match on 4 digit SIC code and for the matching company to have total assets within 20% of the misstatement ﬁrm’s assets.6
Seventy-four ﬁrms were matched using these criteria. Where such a match was
not possible, we matched on 3 digit SIC codes and within 15% of asset size (14
ﬁrms), then a 2 digit SIC match within 10% of assets (18 ﬁrms).
Data on the misstatement and control ﬁrms were gathered from proxy statements of the year preceding the misstatement period. Given that our study was
designed to assess whether loans to executives may have been associated with
misstatements, it was most appropriate to examine whether executive loans
were present when the misstatement began, rather than when the misstatement
ended.
3.2. Loan measures
To determine whether loans were granted to executives, we searched the
proxy statements for any mention of loans to executives. SEC regulations (Item
404(c) of regulation S-K) require disclosure in the proxy statement of any loans
to executives over $60,000.7 Based on this information, two variables were
developed. The ﬁrst measure (‘‘Loans granted’’) was coded 1 if the ﬁrm disclosed that they had granted loans to executives, and 0 if there was no disclosure of granted loans. The latter (0) category could include companies granting
loans below the $60,000 disclosure threshold. Our second measure of executive

5
Our yield rate of 32.2% of ﬁrms in the ﬁnal sample compares favorably to other research in the
area such as Erickson et al. (forthcoming) who examined 287 misstatements, and included only 50
ﬁrms in their sample (a yield rate of 17.4%).
6
Assets in the year preceding the beginning of the misstatement were used to avoid any potential
eﬀect of the misstatement itself on the matching criteria.
7
In addition, some ﬁrms disclosed the availability of executive loans under the ﬁrm’s stock option
plans, but did not disclose that loans had actually been granted. In unreported analyses (with ﬁrms
granting loans excluded), we found that the availability of loans was not signiﬁcantly related to the
probability of misstatement.
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loans (‘‘Dollar amount of loans outstanding’’) was based on the disclosed dollar value of loans that had been granted to executives and were still
outstanding.
3.3. Control variables
To control for other variables that have been shown to be associated with
misstatements, we gathered information on variables falling into three categories: management compensation/ﬁnancial interest, ﬁnancial pressure facing the
ﬁrm, and corporate governance. In the management compensation/ﬁnancial
interest area, we included variables found by previous studies to be related
to misstatements (e.g., Johnson et al., 2004; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi
et al., 2004; Erickson et al., forthcoming). We include as a control variable
CEO’s cash salary, which previous researchers have used to proxy for the
extent to which an executive’s compensation is non-performance-based. CEO
salary has generally been found to be lower for ﬁrms misstating their ﬁnancial
results. CEO bonus is also included (as a percentage of CEO salary). Previous
researchers have used CEO bonus as a measure of the extent to which executives have been rewarded for their past performance. CEO bonus has yielded
mixed results in the literature.
The number of options owned by executives is included to control for the
possibility that executives with more options are more likely to misstate to
ensure their options retain and/or increase their value. The percentage of
shares owned by management is also included to control for the economic
incentives managers may gain from an increased stock price due to misstatements. We also included two variables to measure the ﬁnancial pressure facing
the organization. These two variables are the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial leverage and
whether the ﬁrm experienced a loss in the year preceding the beginning of
the misstatement.
To control for corporate governance characteristics (e.g., Beasley, 1996;
Abbott et al., 2004), we gathered data on the independence of the audit committee, as the literature suggests that independent audit committees may assist
in preventing or detecting misstatement. We also included a variable reﬂecting
the presence of a nominating committee, which may suggest board autonomy
and enhanced governance. In addition, we collected data on whether the same
person held the titles of CEO and Chair of the board (i.e., CEO/Chair duality),
which some studies (e.g., Dechow et al., 1996) have suggested may weaken control and increase the probability of misstatement. The size of the board of
directors was also included to control for the possibility that larger boards
may have greater levels of expertise to prevent/detect misstatements. The percentage of the independent directors was also included, as some researches
have noted that independent directors may have a greater ability to question
management and thereby prevent or discover misstatements.
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3.4. Testing techniques
We ﬁrst developed descriptive statistics for executive loans in ﬁrms misstating
their ﬁnancial results and in ﬁrms not misstating their ﬁnancial results. We then
developed two logistic regression models to distinguish between ﬁrms that misstated and those ﬁrms that did not misstate. In Model 1, the independent variable
of interest was the ‘‘Loans granted’’ variable, while in Model 2, the independent
variable of interest is the ‘‘Dollar amount of loans outstanding’’ variable. Both
regression models also included the control variables discussed above.
4. Results and limitations
4.1. Results
Descriptive statistics and bivariate results are presented in Table 1. For the
measures of executive loans, ﬁrms that misstated their ﬁnancial statements
were more likely to have granted loans to executives than non-misstatement
ﬁrms, and the dollar amount of loans was higher for misstatement ﬁrms than
for non-misstatement ﬁrms. Both of these results are statistically signiﬁcant.
The control variables with signiﬁcant diﬀerences between misstatement and
non-misstatement ﬁrms include options owned by executives, and the presence
of a nominating committee. CEO bonus and board size reﬂect marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
Results of the logistic regression models with misstatement as the dependent
variable are presented in Table 1. Both models are signiﬁcant at 0.001 (with v2s
of 36.79 and 39.89).8 The percentages correctly classiﬁed (72.5% and 72.6%)
indicate that the models provide material incremental explanatory power over
a random model in which 50% of the ﬁrms would be correctly classiﬁed.
The loan measure in each model is highly signiﬁcant. The positive sign on
the loans variable in Model 1 indicates that ﬁrms that grant loans to executives
are signiﬁcantly more likely to misstate revenue than those ﬁrms that do not
grant loans to executives. The results in Model 2 provide some evidence that
the size of loans outstanding is associated with the probability of misstatement.
These results suggest that executive loans make an important incremental contribution to our understanding of the type of ﬁrm that is more likely to misstate
their ﬁnancial statements.9
8

An examination of collinearity diagnostics revealed no material concerns with collinearity.
In unreported analyses, we logistically regressed loans against all of the control variables
included in Table 2. Neither the overall model nor any of the individual variables were signiﬁcant.
This result suggests that the presence or absence of loans is unique contributory factor, and that
granting loans is not a proxy for some other ﬁrm characteristic, such as weak governance
structures. Note also that, in this model, loans were not associated with executive stock ownership.
9
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics and bivariate results
Loans measures

Misstatement
ﬁrms

Non-misstatement
ﬁrms

T

Two tail
p>T

% of ﬁrm with loans granted
Dollar amount of loans outstandinga

28.3%
$924,031

11.3%
$223,143

3.16
3.03

0.0018
0.0028

Control variables
CEO Salary
CEO Bonus
Options owned
% of shares owned
Audit committee independence
% of ﬁrms with nominating committee
% of ﬁrms with CEO/Chair duality
Board size
Percent independent directors
Leverage
% of ﬁrms with loss
Sample size

$289,000
46.4%
2.4 million
27.3%
1.37
15.1%
55.7%
6.95
52.8%
0.579
41.5%
106

$325,400
76.3%
1.1 million
23.0%
1.5
28.3%
59.4%
7.58
55.9%
0.492
33.9%
106

1.10
1.97
2.02
1.45
1.32
2.35
0.55
1.85
1.10
0.82
1.13

0.2739
0.0502
0.0444
0.1497
0.1877
0.0196
0.5805
0.0650
0.2709
0.4133
0.2591

a

T value based on log of dollar amount of loans outstanding due to the highly skewed distribution of the variable.

The control variables of CEO salary and CEO bonus were both marginally
signiﬁcant, except in Model 2 where CEO bonus was signiﬁcant (p = 0.0497).
These results may suggest that CEOs of misstatement companies receive smaller cash salaries and bonuses than their peers. Larger amounts of options
owned by executives are signiﬁcantly related to misstatements. Taken together,
the CEO salary, CEO bonus, and management options variables support ﬁndings in recent research (e.g., Erickson et al., forthcoming) that ﬁrms with more
options-based, and less cash-based, compensation schemes are more susceptible to misstatement. Increased executive stock ownership is not related to misstatements, suggesting that increased managerial stock ownership does not
inhibit misstatements. Neither leverage nor the loss variables were signiﬁcantly
related to the probability of misstatement.
Of the corporate governance control variables,10 only the presence of a
nominating committee is associated (marginally) with the probability of
10

In addition to the control variables included in the model presented in Table 1, we also tested
other control variables in unreported analyses. These other variables include audit committee
ﬁnancial expertise, number of audit committee meetings, blockholdings of stock, etc. The presence
of these additional control variables did not aﬀect the relationship between loans and
misstatements. Inclusion of these additional control variables would also have materially reduced
our sample size as a result of missing data for some of the variables. Given our focus on the
potential eﬀects of loans, we chose to use a more parsimonious model to maintain a reasonable
sample size.
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Table 2
Logistic regression results dependent variable: misstatement (0, 1) estimate (p > v2)
Variables

Model 1

Model 2

Intercept

0.7027 (0.3258)

Tested variables
Loans granted
Dollar amount of loans outstanding

1.2501 (0.0031)

Control variables
CEO Salary
CEO Bonus
Options owned
% of shares owned
Audit committee independence
Nominating committee
CEO/Chair duality
Board size
Percent independent directors
Leverage
Loss
Model statistics
Model v2
p > v2
Sample size
Percentage concordant
Percentage discordant
Percentage tied
Adjusted-count pseudo R2

0.6897 (0.3347)

0.0968 (0.0030)
1.9842
0.3238
0.2292
0.5549
0.0406
0.7644
0.0921
0.0404
0.1571
0.1774
0.1595
36.79
0.0004
212
72.6%
27.1%
0.2%
0.452

(0.0719)
(0.0728)
(0.0221)
(0.4587)
(0.8709)
(0.0545)
(0.7706)
(0.5837)
(0.8630)
(0.4561)
(0.6318)

1.9787
0.3620
0.2216
0.5714
0.0300
0.7667
0.0842
0.0414
0.1847
0.1863
0.1586

(0.0721)
(0.0497)
(0.0275)
(0.4461)
(0.9045)
(0.0543)
(0.7900)
(0.5759)
(0.8395)
(0.4346)
(0.6337)

39.89
0.0004
212
72.5%
27.2%
0.3%
0.450

Variable deﬁnitions
Loan measures
Loans granted
Dollar amount of
loans outstanding
Control variables
CEO Salary
CEO Bonus
Options owned
% of shares owned
Audit committee independence

Nominating committee
CEO/Chair duality

1 = If the ﬁrm has disclosed that loans were granted
0 = No loans granted
Dollar value of loans outstanding (logged)
if loans have been granted (0 if no loans granted)
Salary earned by CEO
Bonus earned by CEO (as % of salary)
Options held by top management group (in millions)
Percentage of shares held by top management
2 = All audit committee members independent directors
1 = All audit committee members independent
or grey directors
0 = Audit committee members include members
of management
1 = ﬁrm has nominating committee
0 = ﬁrms does not have nominating committee
1 = CEO and Board Chair are the same person
0 = CEO and Board Chair are diﬀerent people
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Table 2 (continued)
Variable deﬁnitions
Board size
Percent independent directors
Leverage
Loss

Total number of directors on board
Percentage of board members who are independent
Debt/assets
1 = Firm had net loss year prior to misstatement
0 = Firm had net income year prior to misstatement

misstatement. While these results diﬀer somewhat from earlier research (e.g.,
Beasley, 1996), the results are in accord with more recent research. For example, Baber et al. (2005) found that board of director independence is not associated with misstatements, while the absence of a nominating committee is
associated with misstatements. These corporate governance results may suggest
that the eﬀectiveness of some governance mechanisms may have decreased as
such practices as more independent directors became more widely adopted.
4.2. Limitations
The results presented in this paper are limited by several factors. First, we
only examined revenue misstatements. While revenue misstatements are the
most common type of misstatement, results might have been diﬀerent if other
types of misstatements were included. Second, the period in which the misstatements occurred was prior to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
Other provisions of the Act may have changed the potential relationship
between loans and misstatements. Finally, the relationship between executive
loans and misstatements may be related to an unmeasured variable, such as
organizational culture, aﬀecting both the presence of loans and the probability
of misstatement. As such, we cannot necessarily conclude there is a causal relationship between loans and misstatements.

5. Conclusion
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was the congressional response to the collapse of several large corporations (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, etc.) and the losses
in market value that aﬀected many individuals’ retirement and investment
accounts. Its objective was to improve the reliability and accuracy of corporate
ﬁnancial reporting by, among other things, prohibiting personal loans to executives. The results presented in this paper suggest that ﬁrms that provide loans
to executives are more likely to misstate their ﬁnancial statement than ﬁrms
that do not provide such loans. Despite recent calls for modiﬁcation of the
loan prohibition of the Act, our results support the eﬀectiveness of the loan
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prohibition provision, and suggest it will help to meet the Act’s objective. Overall, our results support the eﬃcacy of the loan prohibitions of the SarbanesOxley Act in achieving the Act’s objective of improving the accuracy and reliability of ﬁnancial reporting.

References
Abbott, L., Parker, S., Peters, G., 2004. Audit committee characteristics and restatements.
Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 23 (1), 69–87.
American Institute of Certiﬁed Public Accountants (AICPA), 2003. SAS 99-Consideration of
Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. Journal of Accountancy 195 (1), 105–119.
Baber, W., Kang, S., Liang, L., 2005. Management entrenchment, board independences and
accounting restatements. Presented at the 2005 AAA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, CA.
Barnard, J., 1989. Corporate loans to directors and oﬃcers – Every business now a bank?
Wisconsin Law Review 31 (3), 237–276.
Beasley, M., 1996. An empirical analysis of the relations between the board of director composition
and ﬁnancial statement fraud. The Accounting Review 71 (4), 443–465.
Beasley, M., Carcello, J., Hermanson, D., 1999. Fraudulent ﬁnancial reporting: 1987–1997. An
Analysis of U.S. Public Companies. Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission, New York.
Burns, N., Kedia, S., 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting.
Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1), 35–67.
Bush, G.W., 2002. President Announces Tough New Enforcement Initiatives for Reform. Available
from: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/images/20020709-4_d070902-515h.
html>. July 9, 2002.
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act of 2002 (Referred
to Senate Committee after being Received from House) (H.R.3763.RFS), April 25, 2002.
Washington, DC.
Dechow, P., Sloan, R., Sweeney, A., 1996. Causes and consequences of earnings manipulation: An
analysis of ﬁrms subjects to enforcement actions by the SEC. Contemporary Accounting
Research 13 (1), 1–36.
Efendi, J., Srivastava, A., Swanson, E., 2004. Why Do Corporate Managers Misstate Financial
Statements? Working paper. Texas A&M University.
Erickson, M., Hanlon, M., Maydew, E., forthcoming. Is there a link between executive equity
incentives and accounting fraud? Journal of Accounting Research, forthcoming. doi:10.1111/
j.1475-679X.2006.00194.x.
Henderson, M., Spindler, J., 2005. Corporate Heroin: A defense of perks, executive loans, and
conspicuous consumption. The Georgetown Law Journal 93 (6).
Ivanovich, D., 2002. Senate targets exec’s loans/Ban on aid from companies OK’d. Houston
Chronicle, 1 (July 13).
Jensen, M., 2004. The agency cost of overvalued equity and the current state of corporate ﬁnance.
European Financial Management 10 (4), 549–565.
Johnson, S., Ryan, H., Tian, Y., 2004. Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud. Working
paper. Louisiana State University.
Kahle, K., Shastri, K., 2004. Executive loans. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39
(4), 791–811.
King, R., 2002. Forgiven. Business 2.0 3 (11).
Labaton, S., 2005. A new mood in congress to relax corporate scrutiny. The New York Times, C3,
(March 10).

C.P. Cullinan et al. / Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25 (2006) 485–497

497

Rich, J., Jones, B., 2005. Facilitating stock ownership through company-sponsored stock option
loans. Journal of Compensation and Beneﬁts 10 (5), 35–39.
Rockefeller, J., 2002. Congressional Record. vol. 148 (93). Washington, DC. (July 11).
Ruxton, K.B., 1999. Executive Pay, 1998. Investor Responsibility Research Center, Washington.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Enrolled as Agreed to or Passed by Both House and Senate).
(H.R.3763.ENR), July 15, 2002. Washington, DC.
Schumer, C., July 12, 2002. Congressional Record. vol. 148 (94). Washington, DC.
Thomas, R., Martin, K., 2000. The determinants of shareholders voting on stock option plans.
Wake Forest Law Review 35 (10), 31–81.
United States General Accounting Oﬃce, 2003. GAO-03-395R Financial Statement Restatement
Database. Available from: <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03395r.pdf>.

